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ABSTRACT 
Recent years have witnessed an increasing use of cconometric analysis in anns 
race studies. The present article reviews this past and the potential future contribu-
tion of econometrics to arms race research and concludes that so far the main im-
pact of the new approach has been on efforts at parameter estimation. Therefore, a 
number of problems typically arising in the application of econometric techniques 
to the estimation of arms race modeJs from empirical time series data are discussed, 
and the need for a thorough investigation of tbe small-sample properties of the re-
sults of common procedures is demonstrated. Finally, the considerable potential of 
econometrics for refining current arms race models is illustrated in the context of 
asymmetric response and distributed lag hypotheses. 
l. Introduction 
Ernpirical analysis of theoreticaJly inspired arms race models dates 
back to Richardson's work on the outbreak of World War 1. Despite 
theoretical elegance, Richardson's studies - which culminated in a post-
humous book-length publication in 1960 - suffer from crude method-
ology which caused several questionable or erroneous inferences [ l J. 
Tue same goes for some of the first quantitative arms race studies (e.g. 
Smoker 1963a, l 963b) which followed Rapoport's (1957) attempt to 
bring Richardson's work to the attention of a wider audience. 
Modern methodology did not make its way into the field of arms 
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race research until recently so that we are only now witnessing the 
beginning of systematic empirical evaluation of arms race models. This 
process should finally yield some insights on whether and when such 
models do in fact explain observed reality or merely offer heuristic in-
sights. At the heart of this current revolution of arms race research is 
the borrowing of econometric techniques. lt is therefore useful to ask 
at the outset how econometrics has so far been utilized in arms race 
studies, what are the typical problems posed by its application to the 
field, and whether it offers additional benefits which might bc ex-
ploited. 
2 .. The Econometric Approach to Arms Race Research 
In a rccent review (Luterbacher, 1975) of the '•state of the art'~ of 
arms race modeling and research, three contributions are claimed for 
the econometric perspective: 
1. Analysis of arrns races in tenns of rational decision-making subject 
to a goal function and to cost constraints. 
2. Apprehension of the discrete character of decision-making by 
using difference equations rather than differential equations. 
3. Application of advanced methodological techniques for estimating 
model parameters. 
The second issue is a purely formal one and will not be considered in 
this article. Since the estimation of models is at the core of econometrics, 
there can be no doubt about its methodological impact on arms race 
studies. lt is questionable, however, whether the notion of an arms race 
as an interaction of rationally designed strategies constrained by the 
scarcity of resources can be attributed to the econometric perspective. 
Assuming 1971 as the year that saw the first significant contribution 
of the econornetric approach to the study of arms race phenomena it is 
obvious that by that time the analysis of goal-directed behavior in 
armament competitions a1ready bad an impressive history. 1971 is sug-
gested by the publication of Larnbelet's (1971) article on the Middle 
East and of Mihalka 's ( 1971) thesis. Prior to that date a number of 
studies had appeared, among them those by Ash (1951 ), Bums (1959), 
Hoag (1961), Kent (1963), McGuire (1965), Intriligator (1964, l 968a, 
l 968b), and Deagle (1967), that all departed from Richardson's bJack-
box approach to the intemal structure of the opponents in an arms race 
by treating their policies as deliberate and rational strategies derived 
from -more or less sophisticated goals. The intellectual origins of most 
of these studies can be traced to operations research, decision- and 
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game-theory, and cost-utility ana1ysis. Most recent contributions in the 
same vein are the articJes by Brito {1972, 1974) and Intriligator (1975). 
Thus, there was a wealth of theoretical literature on strategic models of 
arrns races upon which econometric analysis could draw when it finally 
rnade its way into the field. 
Similarly, the most convincing dcparture from Richardson 's sirnplis-
tic treatment of cost and supply constraints was published years ahead 
of the first econometric study of arms race behavior. Those who have 
summarized the litcrature (e.g. Busch, 1970, Chatterjee, 1971, or 
Rattinger, 1975) agree that Caspary's (1967) model comprises the most 
elaborate view of the inhibiting eff ects of economic burdens on arma-
rnent races. This model, however, is not inspircd by the econornetric 
approach. Those recent contributions to the field that have used econo-
metric techniques, on the other hand, have consistently proceeded with 
rnodeJs involving cost constraints in rnuch cruder f ashion than proposed 
by Caspary. As Luterbacher has pointed out this is largely due to the 
nonlinear character of Caspary's model which poses a serious identifica-
tion problem. 
All this suggests that so far only the third point quoted at the outset 
describes the genuine innovation of the econometric perspective in arms 
race research. This statement does not belittle the importance of econo-
rnetrics but serves to focus attention where it belongs, i.e. on the meth-
odological issues raised by attempts to estimate arms race models. Such 
problems could be recognized right from the beginning. Lambelet 
(1971 ), e.g., obtained impressive fits f or bis models of the Middle East 
arms race up to 1965 but rnany model parameters were not significant 
due to multicollinearity. Luterbacher has listed some further problems 
typically arising in the econometric analysis of arms races in his recent 
review artic1e. The present article will now turn to a few of these as well 
as to some other issues that so far have received little attention in anns 
race studies. 
3. Some Problems of Estimating Arms Race Models 
Luterbacher (1975) narnes three problems complicating the estima-
tion of parameters of arms race models: 
1. Substantial considerations, e.g. on the effect of cost constraints, 
rnight lead researchers to use nonlinear rnodels. Most standard pro-
cedures of econometrics, however, are geared to linear formula-
tions. 
2. Substantial arguments, again, suggest that in the long run more 
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complex models than thosc currently in vogue will bc introduced. 
Approximating modcls to reality by including additional variables, 
however, will add free parameters aml thus produce a serious de-
grecs of frccdom problem -- especially with the short duration of 
some arms races. 
3. There rnight be a chance that established techniques cannot yield 
reliable estimates of the parameters of cndogenously unstable rcla-
tionships which are often alleged to be characteristic of arrns races. 
These thrcc issucs will now be discusscd togcther with availabJe soJu-
tions. We will then turn to some difficul lies with autocorrclated rcsid-
uals which deserve as much attention as the problems mentioned by 
Luterbacher. 
ESTIMATJON OF NONLINEAR MODELS 
Talking about nonlinear models, one has to remcmber the distinction 
betwcen models that are non linear with respect to variables bu t linear 
in the parameters that arc to be estimated and models nonlincar both in 
variables and parameters. Models of the first group are also called 
"intrinsically linear" whereas those of the second type are designated as 
"intrinsically nonJinear~' (Kmcnta, 1971 ). 
Tue basic feature of intrinsically linear modcls is that they can be 
converted into linear models by an appropriate transformation of vari-
ables. They theref ore prescnt no particular estimation problems. A 
simple examplc is 
Yr = ax~_ ;+ e, (1) 
wherc the error term e1 is randomly distributed around zcro with con-
stant variance. Regardlcss of k therc is a transf ormation z1_; = xf_; which 
allows (l) to bc rewritten as 
(2) 
which is linear. 
Models with interaction terms serve as another example of intrinsic-
ally linear models. lnteraction terms are thc simplest way of formalizing 
the notion that the change in thc depcndcnt variable corresponding to a 
given change in an indepcndcnt variable x 1 depends on the level of 
another independent variable x2. 
(3) 
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If we write z,_; = Xt,t-i x2,t-i we again have the linear model (2). After 
a series of such transf ormations, e .g., Richardson 's non linear submissive-
ness rnodel poses no unusual obstacles to estimation. 
As a third case of an intrinsically linear model (2] consider the multi-
plicative model which is analogous to Lambelet's model of the Middle 
East arms race: 
- ht bk 
Y1-ax1 t-i···xk 1-1·e1 . ' (4) 
This model is linear in the logarithms of the variables and can be re-
written as 
'- I b r b r Y, -a + 1X1 t-i + ··· + kXkr-1·+et , , (5) 
where .v; = 11(y1) etc. There are many other nonlinear models which can 
be similarly transformed into linear equations, as e.g. exponential or 
hyperbolic f unctions. 
For intrinsically nonlinear rnodels things are more complicated. 
Imagine, e.g., that in (4) the disturbance has been entered additively or 
consider Caspary's (1967) nonlinear arrns race model. In those cases 
there is no transf ormation leading to a linear model as nonlinearity per-
tains to parameters. A general solution to the estimation problem is 
available, however, which also applies to such models. 
lt is necessary, as a first step, to set up the likelihood function f or 
the model to be estirnated. Then, its partial derivatives with respect to 
all unknown parameters are tak.en and set equal to zero. The problern 
of this maximurn likelihood approach then is to solve the resulting sys-
tem of normal equations for the unknown parameters. Generally there 
will be no straightforward analytical solutions available whenever these 
equations are nonlinear in parameters and iterative numerical proce-
dures must be employed. Such programs usually start frorn "intel1igent 
guesses" of the numerical values of the parameters, directly compute 
the likelihood function, and then vary those values in order to maxi-
mize the likelihood f unction [ 3]. These procedures thus output maxi-
m um likelihood estimates of model parameters. 
A final point conceming nonlinear models should briefly be made. 
Usually such rnodels receive a substantial rationale, i.e. it is assumed a 
priori that certain factors govem the behavior of arms racing nations 
and that the functional form of their influence is a nonlinear one (e.g. 
Luterbacher, 1975, p. 212). Assumptions of this kind ignore the possi-
bility to treat the specification of a model as testable. In view of the 
practical difficulties with the estimation of intrinsically nonlinear 
426 
models it seems worthwhile to test for linearity of the rclationship be-
tween dependent variables and potcntia] explanatory variables before 
employing non linear models by availabJe tests f or linearity (Kmcnta, 
197 I , chapter 11 ). 
SHORT TIME SERJES VERSUS COMPLEX MODELING 
lf we measure the complexity of an arms race model by its number 
of variables it is obvious that the complexity of modeling is constrained 
by the duration of the race a particular modcl is to bc applied to. With 
lirnited-information methods there is gencrally no difficuJty in esti-
mating a model when the overall number of predctcrmincd variables 
exceeds the number of observatjons as long as this is not the case for 
any single equation (Theil, 1973). But thc issue thcn is to determine 
whether cstimation rcsults do ~upport the specification of the model. 
The reader is reminded that if we now briefly discuss inferences from 
short arms races we are really addressing only one facet of a complex 
problcm. On the one band one might argue that anns race data are 
population and not sample data, and on the the other hand it is con-
ceivable that highly significant results will not be reproducible across 
cases, e.g. due to systematic measurement error. Because of space limi-
tations there can be no attempt here to reconcile thcse considerations 
with the econometric perspective. 
The goodness-of-fit of a multiple regression equation - as measured 
by R 2 - is going to go up whenever we rcduce thc number of observa-
tions and/or increase the number of variables. lt is theref ore unwise to 
be ovetwhelmed by R 2s that look impressive in bivariate analysis as 
such "good fits" havc to be expected whenever there is a serious prob-
lem with degrees of frecdom. If we have, e.g., six observations but as 
many as four explanatory variables only R 2s above .99 wi11 be signifi-
cant at the .05-leve1. Goodnes-of-fit by itself thus is a wcak criterion 
for accepting hypotheses or not and should be augmente<l by F-ratios 
and their significance Ievels. This is especially relevant whenever we 
compare models with different numbers of explanatory variables. 
Usually it should also prove usefuJ to consider parameter estimates 
and thcir standard errors because in many cases we will previously have 
sct up hypotheses on thcir approximate numerical values or on some 
parameters being significantly distinct from each other or from zero, 
etc .. [ 4]. As long as one has at least a f ew degrees of freedom lcft it 
should be possible to perf orm tests likc these and to reject or modify 
one's model accordingly. The main difficulty in applying arms race 
models t.o races of short duration theref ore is not the availabi1ity of 
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appropriate methodology but rather this necessity to maintain a mini-
mum number of degrees of freedom. 
This prerequisite can only be met by fitting extremely parsimonious 
models. The opportunity for more complex modeling is thus tied to the 
occurrence of armament races of longer duration so that often com-
plexity will have to be sacrificed f or testability. This poses a dilemma if 
one or more variables are known to have a substantial impact on the 
behavior or arms racing opponents but have to be excluded from the 
model for the sake of simplicity. The choice then presents itself be-
tween knowingly committing a specification error in order to be ablc to 
estimate the resulting modeJ or correctly to specify a model which can-
not be estimated. Fortunately, under certain (testable) assumptions 
(Kmenta, 1971, chapter l 0) the detrimental effects of ornitting a rele-
vant explanatory variable are limited and lead to conservative inferences 
so that the former option does not have tobe self-defeating. 
ESTJMATION IN THE UNST ABLE CASE 
Most challenging of the three problems raised in Luterbacher's review 
is the third. Consider as given a set of data on the armament policies of 
two antagonists over time and imagine that precise knowledge on the 
behavioral laws governing thls interaction and on their parameters is 
available. lf we now remove all exogenous variables from the system - i.e. 
those variables whlch do not appear as dependent variables - it be-
comes possible to apply criteria for equilibria as well as stability to the 
resulting closed system. Assume this closed systern to be an unstable 
one. According to Luterbacher (1975: 215) least squares methods will 
then not produce reliable parameter estirnates from the data. More pre-
cisely, he thinks that least squares estimates will be biased down ward 
toward stability. 
Before confronting this assertion with some results from the litera-
ture a few remarks on its implications f or anns race research seem in 
order. Looking for stability or instability of arms races would not be 
worthwhile if there was in fact a systematic bias as one would often 
produce erroneous conclusions in favor of stability based on biased 
parameter estimates of truly unstable systems. But also if one does not 
think analyses of stability to be among the most relevant contributions 
of arms race studies the alleged bias could lead to serious difficulties, 
particularly in attempts to forecast. 
Viewed in a somewhat broader and skeptical perspective, however, 
the problem of endogenously unstable systems loses some of its impor-
tance. If we realize that in their studies of arms races researchers are fre-
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quently forced to app)y aJmost ridiculousJy ovcrsimplificd models to 
short series of unreliable <lata it should bc obvious that cvcn without 
this additional problem there will usual1y be reason cnough to expect 
biased and unreliable parametcr estimatcs. More often than not mo<lels 
will be riddcn by spedfication errors, measurement error will be non-
random, and the assumptions of the linear regression modcl will be 
more or lcss scvereJy violated. Under such circumstances one shouJd he 
content if estimation results allow some crude conclusions at least on 
the relative impact of a numbcr of variables on anns race behavior. 
According to this view, confidence in the exact numerical values of 
parameter estimates would be inappropriate anyway and regardless of 
stabi1ity. 
But Jet us now assume a world where all these standard problcms of 
applied regrcssion analysis do not exist and our only worry is the esti-
mation of explosive systcms. To begin with, considcr the simple first-
order autorcgrcssivc process 
Yt::;;;ay,_l+e, (6) 
where e1 is a normally distributed random error tenn with mean zero 
and finite standard deviation. The least squares (and also maximum 
likelihood) estimatc of a, a, is 
T T 
{J ~ (L; YtYt- 1)/(I; Yt-1) 
t=l t=l 
(7) 
Thc propcrties of a can be analyzed in four situations. First, its asymp-
totic (large-sample) properties can bc confrontcd with its properties in 
small samples. Second, the stable case with lal < 1 has to be distin-
guished from the unstabJe or explosive case lal > 1. The circu1ar case 
lal = 1 wi11 not be considered here [5]. 
Anderson (1959) has shown that with incrcasing samplc size a is an 
un biascd and consistent estimate of a and tends to bc normally distri-
buted around a with finite variance if the successive errors e1 are distri-
buted indcpendcntly and identically. These results have been gcnerdl· 
ized for the stable vector case (Anderson, 1971, chapter 5-5) which is 
of particular concem for arms race analysis. This implies that in large 
samples stable autoregressive systems can be estimated by the usual pro-
cedures. 
A number of authors have invcstigated the asymptotic properties of 
estimates of non-stationary autoregressive systems [ 6 J. They all facc 
the difficulty described by Luterbacher, i.e. that for lal > 1 the vari-
ance of Yt as well as Yt itself grow towards infinity with large t evcn 
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though the variance of e1 has been assumed constant in selecting a as an 
cstimate. Nevcrthcless, all explorations of the asymptotic properties of 
a reported in the literature seem to contradict his conjecture that this 
assumption might produce a stability bias in a. Studies by Rubin (1950), 
White (1958, 1959), Anderson (l 959), and Rao (1961) all allow the 
conclusion that a will be an asymptotically unbiascd, consistent, and 
efficient estimate of a if the errors e1 are independently normally dis-
tributed and if lal > 1. Most of these results have also been shown to 
hold for unstable autoregressive processes of arbitrary ordcr (Rao, 
1961). Anderson (1959) has generalized bis analysis for the unstable 
vector case, and he concludes that the usual procedures arc applicable. 
All these results have been obtained, however, assuming a zero constant 
term. 
For arms race research with its short series of data, proofs on asymp-
totic properties of estimates offer little consolation. This becomes evi-
dent if we now turn to stable autoregressive processcs in sma11 samples. 
The relevant body of literature is very restricted. For sample sizcs of 
three and four Hurwicz (1950) has proved that ä has a downward bias if 
0 ~ a ~ 1, and hc has also analytically derived the size of thc bias f or 
various other small sample sizes. He finds downward bias to be strongest 
when a tends toward zero, i.e. when the process is maximally damped. 
If a approaches unity the limit of the ratio a/a also is one regardless of 
sample size. The largest bias (a/a =. 73) occurs with samples of size four 
and a approaching zero. With growing samples greater than four a/a 
monotonically increases toward unity for all values of a. These results 
suggest that the bias in a is negligible evcn in small samples if the true 
value of lal is close to one. The smaller lal, however, the more observa-
tions we need for ä to be an approximately unbiased estimate of a [ 7]. 
Unfortunately, analogous investigations so f ar have not been reported 
f or higher-order autoregressive processes and/or the autoregressive vector 
case. 
To the best of my knowledge, no analyses exist of the problems aris-
ing in efforts to estimate explosive autoregressive systems from few 
observations. As the objective of this section is only to survey the liter-
ature for available results no attempts will be made to overcome this 
deficiency. A series of Monte Carlo exp~riments over a range of models, 
sample sizes and values of a appears as the most promising strategy to 
generate the required infonnation on the existence of bias in small-
sample estimates. Considering Hurwicz's results for the stable case it 
seems possible that the bias conjectured by Luterbacher for the asymp-
totic case might in fact instead be present in estimates from small sam-
p1es describing explosive processes. 
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AUTOCORRELATED RESIDUALS IN AUTOREGRESSIVE MODELS 
The errors e, in (6) have been assumed tobe randomly and indepen-
dently distributed. This assumption will frequently be violated in em-
pirical applications. For non-autoregressive models, howcver, auto-
correlation of errors will not lead to biased or inconsistent least squares 
estimates, not even from small samp1es (Kmenta, 1971, chapter 8-2). 
For autoregressive models like (6) and therefore for most arms race 
models things are different. The combination of lagged endogenous 
variables and serially correlated errors generates biascd and inconsistent 
least squares estimates in smaJI and large samples. Even with an infinite 
number of observations ordinary least squares estimates wi11 not con-
verge to thc true parameter values (Theil, 1971, chapter 8-7). This can 
be shown for (6) by assuming that the errors are themselves governed 
by a first-order autoregressive process 
(8) 
where u1 is randomly distributed with zero mean and finite standard 
deviation. (6) can then be written as: 
Y1 = (a + P)Yt-1 - payt-2 + u, (9) 
Since the explanatory variable y,_2 is excluded when (6) is estimated, 
the least squares estimate a from (6) can be shown to bc for large sam-
ples (Hibbs, 1974): 
lim a = (a + p)/(l + pa) (10) 
This estimate contains a bias which tends to 
a - a = p(l - a2)/(l + pa) (11) 
lt has been similarly demonstrated that the least squares estimate p of 
the first-order autocorrelation coefficient derived from observed resid-
uals from (6) also contains a bias which is equal to (11) in magnitude 
but opposite in sign (Malinvaud, 1970, chapter 15-5). This implies that 
an empirical estimate ß will not enable us to correct for bias in ä. This 
example is a very extreme one as in (6) there are no exogenous variables 
at all. Malinvaud (1970) has shown analytically and by Monte Carlo 
experiments that least squares bias in the cstimation of autoregressive 
processes with autocorrelated disturbances is greatly reduced by the 
presence of exogenous variables. 
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There remains the problem of arriving at consistent estimates of the 
parameters of an autoregressive model whenever these parameters and/or 
the process generating its disturbances are unknown. If there are sound 
a priori reasons for assuming a specific interdependence structure of the 
disturbances the parameters of both the model and the error structure 
can be estimated by ordinary least squares from an equation analogous to 
(9). Gcnerally, however, such prior knowledge is unavailab)e and other 
techniques have to be used which investigate error structures and esti-
mate model parameters at the same time [8). Unfortunately the small-
sample properties of available methods are either unsatisfactory or as 
yet unknown. Together with the foregoing section this suggests that the 
exploration of the properties of estimation procedures for stationary 
and explosive autoregressive processes with systematically interacting 
errors in vcry small samples by means of experimental analyses deserves 
highest priority if the way is to be paved f or a large-scale application of 
econometric estimation methods in arms race research. 
4. The Potential of Econometrics for Modeling Arms Races 
As said earlier, the benefit of econometrics for the study of arms 
races so far has been in the borrowing of its estimation methods. lt 
might now be useful to demonstrate that its contribution does not have 
to be confined to estimation but that it offers a considerable potential 
for the construction and refinement of models. This will be illustrated 
herein the context of asymmetric response and distributed lag models. 
ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE MODELS 
Models of arms races have generally assumed the effects of changes in 
explanatory variables upon dependent variables to be symmetric. This 
assumption is easily illustrated f or Richardson 's classical two-nation 
model. Substituting first differences for derivatives and allowing for 
variable lags in the response to the enemy's arms we write this model as 
x t = ax t - 1 + cy t-; + g (12) 
Yt = byt- l + dx1_i + h (13) 
lt is obvious from (12) that the absolute effects on x of a unit increase 
and a unit decrease of y are identical. 
This irnplication of the classical model can be challenged on substan-
tial grounds, and some interpretations of the current East-West arms 
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competition can serve as an example. Many political and military leaders 
of the Western Alliance maintain - whether rightly or not docs not 
matter here - that the Soviet Union and her allies have, during the last 
decade or so, greatly intensified their defense efforts while thc miliary 
prcparations of the West havc slackened or even decreased in the same 
period. lf these obscrvations were correct the Richardsonian modeJ 
would be unable to explain this confrontation as it predicts restraint on 
the one side after a previous parallel build-up to be rcciprocated by the 
other side. 
This difficulty can be overcome by the hypothesis of asymmetric 
response, i.e. the notion that the change in a dependent variable asso-
ciated with a unit increase in an explanatory variable differs in absolute 
magnitude from the change effected by a unit decrease in the same 
variable. Applied to arms races its most extreme version would be that 
decreases in the adversary 's capability are systematically ignored where-
as increases are consistently answered by stepping up the own nation's 
military posture. Tailored to Richardson 's model, this version of asym-
metric rcsponse is formalizcd in ( 14) and ( 15). 
x 1 = ax1_ 1 + c(C1 _;Yt-i + 1 C1 _; - l lur_;) + g 
y I = b y 1- 1 + d(D t - ;X t - i + 1 D t - J - 1111 t J) + h 
whcre 
v I = t-
max(y m) (m = 1, 2, ... , t - i - 1) 
max(xn) (n = 1, 2, ... , t - j - 1) 
c = { 0 if there is a y m ( m = 1 , 2, ... , t - i - 1 ) wi th y 1 _ ; < Y m 
1 - 1 1 otherwise 
D . = { 0 if thcre is a Xn (n = 1, 2, ... , t - j - 1) with x,_„ < Xn 
1-1 1 otherwise 
(14) 
(15) 
One disadvantage of this modification is that the additionaJ explana· 
tory power of the asymmetric response hypothesis can be assessed only 
indirectly. lt can be evaluated more directly by including it into a 
dummy variable as in (16) and (17): 
x1 =ax,_ 1 +cy1 _; +kC1_;Yr-i +g 
y 1 =by1_1 + dx1 _ 1 + ID,_1x,_1 + h 
whcrc 
C . ={ 1 ify,_;<;Yt-i-l 
,_, 0 otherwise 
D = { 1 if x1 _1 ~x,_1_1 
r- f O otherwise 
(16) 
(17) 
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This variant is less sophisticated than the first one as it does not pre-
cisely specify what is going to happen to the defense efforts of one side 
if the other side does not increase its own military preparations and vice 
versa. Instead, it merely asserts that the first nation's responsc will bc 
different according to whether the second state either increases its 
military effort or not, i.e. holds it constant or even reduces it. The 
benefit of this morc general hypothesis is that it is readily tested by 
testing the hypotheses k = 0 and l = 0. 
OISTRIBUTED LAG MODELS 
All arms race models proposed so far f ollow Richardson in assuming 
that each side's armaments at a given time depend upon a set of explan-
atory variables in just one or at most two previous points in time. Tue 
same goes for the models from the section on asymmetric responsc, but 
this assumption does not seem overly realistic. Whether it can neverthc-
less bc justified in a particular arms race hingcs upon the theoretical 
framework our model is derived from and upon the indicators that are 
assumed to characterize this competition. 
Generally, however, it is reasonable to suppose that the q uantitativc 
and qualitative composition of one side's armaments in each consecu-
tive interval - for convenience considcr these intervals to be years -
serves as a stimulus to the adversary's military build-up. This stimulus 
will usually not be responded to instantaneously and complctely but 
will rathcr induce or intensify defense programs which will stretch 
out over several years. Thus, looking backwards. a given military pos-
ture of one nation or alliance appears as a function of a series of 
previous force levels of its opponent. 
This suggests the application of distributed lag models to the analysis 
of arms races. In theory. the numbcr of lagged values of the opponenfs 
arms levels which may be taken into account is unlimited. In practice 
we will proceed more restrictively if we realize that the effect of distant 
armaments levels of an adversary upon a nation 's military stance is 
negligible in comparison to more recent ones. This leads to the adop-
tion of a geometric lag perspective which has thc cffects of past hostile 
armaments deline in geometric progression. 
Geometrie lag models can be deduccd in two different ways (Kmenta, 
1971 ). The first rationale is usually presented as the hypothesis of 
"adaptive expectationsu. Applied to arms races it implies that the arms 
Jevel x 1 of A will be a function not of the past or prescnt actual capabil-
ity y of its enemy 8 but rather of the capability y; which A expects B 
to acquire in t. Proceeding from Richardson's model (12) and introduc-
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ing a stochastic crror term ei.r with zero mean and finite variance for 
estimation purposes we obtain: 
(18) 
Since y; is not readily observable we havc to specify thc process 
generating A's expectation of B's military capability. A straightforward 
approach is to vicw A as comparing the previous expectation to the 
actual behavior of B and then modif ying currcnt expectations accord-
ingly: 
O<p~I (19) 
Equation (19) states that thc value of .v expected by A in t is a weighted 
avcrage of the expected and actual values ofy in the preceding interva1. 
By means of the so-calJed "Koyck transformation,, (Koyck, 1954) (19) 
can be shown to be equivalent to 
(20) 
Substituting (20) into ( 18) we have 
Eq ua tion (21) shows that the hypothesis of adaptive expecta tions when 
introduced into Richardson 's modeJ Jeads to a geometric lag representa-
tion. As this equation is difficult to estimate it is simplificd by 1agging 
onc period, multiplying by p, and subtracting the result from (21): 
x, = (a + PlXr- L - Paxr-2 + c(l - P)Yt-1 + 0 - p)g + e2,t (22) 
where 
Note that (22) is exactly identified. 
The second rationale f or geometric lag models is often called the 
"partial adjustmentn hypothesis. Applied to arms races it says that each 
side at each time has a desired or optimal arms levcl to which it trics to 
adjust its actual capability. lf x;' is A's desired potential A would com-
pare x(' to the actual previous armaments and then try to make good 
the discrepancy as much as possibJe by choosing x 1• 
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- (II • )+ x, - xt- l - r x 1 · x1_ 1 e3 ,1 O<r~ 1 (23) 
r measures the success of A in adjusting actual to desircd capabilities 
which again are not directly observable so that the process gcnerating 
thcm has to be specified. A simple formulation is that the arms level 
currently desired by A is a linear function of B's prec.eding capacity, 
Yt- 1: 
x~' = cy,_ t + g + e4,r (24) 
Substituting (24) into (23) yiclds 
x, = ( 1 ··· r )x 1 _ 1 + rc:y 1 _ 1 + rg + e 5 ,r (25) 
where 
es,r = re4,t + C3,1 
Equation (25) is an intcrpretation of Richardson 's classical model 
and again is cxactly idcntified. To reveal its character as a gcometric lag 
represcntation it has to be laggcd onc period, multiplied by (1 -r), the 
result has to be subtracted from (25), and an expansion of series has to 
be performed. To savc spacc the result is not shown herc. 
A gcometric lag model of arms race behavior can also he deduced by 
combining partial adjustmcnt and adaptive expectation hypotheses. lf 
we assume that the military capability x;' desired by A at timet is not a 
linear function of B's actual anns levcl but rather of the capability y~ 
which A expects B to attain in t we can write: 
(26) 
This rnodel, called a compound gcometric lag model, can bc trans-
lated into observable variables by substituting y; from (20) and x;' from 
(23) into (26) which leads to 
x, = (1 - r)xt- 1 + rc(l - Pl<Yr-1 + PYt-2 + P2Yt-3 + ... ) + (27) 
+ rg + e1,1 
where 
Equation (27) clearly describes the geometric decline in thc influcnce 
of past values of y upon x but is not directly amenable to estimation. 
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Again applying the Koyck transformation yields 
x1 = (1 - r + Pi\'1_ 1 - (l -- r)px,_ 2 + (1 ···· p)rcy1 . 1 + 
+ 0 - p)rg + es.1 
where 
es.1 = e, ,t - pe7 ,t- 1 
(28) 
(28) is cxactly idcntified and idcntical to (22) in its variables but its 
cocfficients dcmonstratc that it combincs partial adjustment and adap-
tive expectations. lf r = 1 it is a pure adaptive expectations model, if 
p = 0 it is a pure partial adjustmcnt model, and if both conditions arc 
met (28) rcduccs to a bivariatc regrcssion cquation. 
As this section is concemed with the potential of cconometrics for 
the specification of arms race models estimation problems will not be 
considered [ 9]. Suffice it to say that partial adjustmcnt modcls Jike 
(25) can generally be estimated by ordinary least squares if successive 
errors are uncorrelated. This is not truc for adaptive expcctation or 
compound modcls, even if the latter condition is met. The reason is 
that (22) and (28) contain error terms which are correlated with the 
independent variable Yr-l· Ordinary least squares regression would thus 
produce inconsistent estimates of th~ cocfficients and aJternative meth-
ods have to be used. 
5. Conclusion 
This scction is to sum up and to indicate topics of interest for future 
scrutiny. By borrowing econometric estimation techniques, arms race 
rcsearchcrs have to face all the problems arising from resorting to non-
linear modcling, from the necessity of cstimating models from short 
series of data, and from the occunence of unstable autoregressivc rcla-
tionships and of autocorrelated residuals. The latter two issues appear 
especially discomf orting as the small-sample properties of the estimates 
of parameters of autoregressive systems are not well known and as there 
are reasons to suspect bias regardless of stabi1ity and autocorrelation of 
residuals. Systematic studies of the small-sample properties of such esti-
mates by Monte Carlo experiments theref ore dcserve high priority if the 
benefits of econometrk estimation techniques are to be f ully exploited 
in future arms racc analyses. 
Two examples have served here to illustrate the potential contribu-
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tion of econometrics for developing more realistic arms race models. 
Allowing for distributed lags and for asymmetries in the response to an 
adversary's armanents eliminates unnecessarily restrictive and untenable 
assumptions which have been relied on by previous modcls. One might 
therefore expect that these two rnechanisms - possibly in combination 
- will in some cases provide an explanation of empirically observed 
armament dynamics where other mode1s have failed. lt will take a series 
of empirical studies along these lines to go beyond conjecture. 
Notes 
1. For a proof that Richardson 's classical two-nation model is actually disconfirmed 
hy the very pre-World War 1 data his famous "confirmation" is performed with 
see Rattinger (1975). 
2. For further examples see, e.g., Wonnacott and Wonnacott ( 1970, chapter 4). 
3. An introduction to techniques of nonlinear estimation and an overview of some 
standard programs can be found in Draper and Smith ( 1966, chapter l 0). Results 
on the asymptotic (large·sample) properties of non-linear estirnation results are 
presented by Malinvaud ( 1970, chapter 9). 
4. See Theil (1971, chapter 3-7). 
5. This case is hricfly dealt with by Rubin (1950). 
6. An article by Rao (1961) contains a table sum marizing available results on the 
asymptotic properties of estimates of stable as well as unstable autoregressive 
processes of first or higher order. 
7. Similar results arc presented by Malinvaud ( 1970, chapter 14-3). 
8. Available techniques are discussed by Malinvaud ( 1970, chapter 14-6) and Hibbs 
( 1974). 
9. The problems arising in the estimation of distributed lag models in general and 
geometric lag models in particular are treated extensively by MaJinvaud ( J 970. 
chapter 15), Theil (1971, chapters 6-5 and 8-8), and Kmenta (1971, chapter 11· 
4). 
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